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Abstract
 The so-called nine-dash line drawn by China in the South China Sea has recently 
been a hot issue in the field of international law. The Philippines’ unilateral institution of an 
arbitral procedure against China over the issue of the dashed line, in particular, has attracted 
the world’s attention. The legal nature and meaning of the dashed line are not clear, and its 
validity under the current law of the sea is very controversial. China’s traditional but peculiar 
way of interpreting situations involving the South China Sea and its own specific state 
practice, which includes some legislative measures, are among the unclear and confusing 
factors to consider in applying international law. The history of the dashed line, the political 
environment of East Asia, the complex development of the law of the sea, and some other 
related maritime and territorial issues make the issue more difficult to deal with. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine the legal meaning of the dashed line in the South China Sea 
in light of its historical background, the development of the law of the sea, and the state 
practice of China and Taiwan, to name a few factors. The paper concludes that practical, 
comprehensive, and multifaceted approaches to this issue may be more useful than the strict 
application and interpretation of law, since the limited scope and nature of the current rules 
and principles of international law renders them unable to facilitate a full solution to the 
dispute over the South China Sea.
Key words: South China Sea, Nine Dash Line, Historic Rights, Historic Waters, territorial 
and maritime dispute
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Ⅰ．Introduction
 The so-called nine-dash line （“九段線”） drawn by China in the South 
China Sea has been named, cited, and referred to in many ways in both Chinese 
and English1. Theform and geographical position of the line is variously shown 
on maps and atlases disseminated throughout the world2. Today, the legal 
connotation of the line, and particularly the manner of interpreting it, is a hot 
debate in and around China3. One of the reasons why there is no fixed name or 
meaning for the line may be that China itself has not so far made any official 
account on this issue. Therefore, despite the fact that there have been various 
analyses and arguments made with respect to the dashed line, an enigmatic 
situation has emerged in which numerous speculations and secondary debates 
have proliferated, puzzling the practitioners in the diplomatic realm engaged in 
actual consultations and negotiations. This has not been helped by the unclear 
and vague contributions of the debates and analyses mentioned above. 
 At the beginning of 2013, the Philippines4 unilaterally submitted a 
dispute with China5 concerning the dashed line to an arbitral tribunal under 
the procedure prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea （UNCLOS）6. The arbitral tribunal addressing this dispute was formed 
without China’s participation in the procedure7, and has recently begun its 
work8. Since the issues around the formation of this arbitral tribunal and other 
related procedural aspects are beyond the scope of this paper, the author will 
not focus on this case more than necessary9. 
 In this paper, the author discusses the significance of and particular 
perspective on the ‘dashed line’ （a term that will be used to describe to the 
line discussed above, unless otherwise indicated） with special reference to 
the arguments and opinions of Chinese scholars and writers. This aspect has 
not been fully paid attention to in the study of the South China Sea dispute, 
partly due to the Eurocentric viewpoints of international law and international 
relations. Thus, this article also sheds light on some often neglected issues such 
as Chinese approaches to this dispute as a whole. Although one focus of the 
present study is the meaning of the dashed line in light of international law 
and the law of the sea, an understanding of the traditional ideas and historical 
background of China10, would certainly enable a better understanding of 
China’s standpoint with respect to international law and territorial disputes as 
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a whole11. This paper is limited in its scope: it examines the significance of and 
perspective on the dashed line in the realm of the South China Sea dispute, 
leaving a more detailed analysis of this issue for another occasion.
Ⅱ．Four Interpretations for Interpreting the Dashed Line
 It seems that in China, which has proudly enjoyed its long history as a 
great power, most of people have taken it for granted that the South China 
Sea has fallen within the geographical limits in which China has enjoyed 
special rights. However, considering China’s complicated domestic situation, 
the People’s Republic of China （the Beijing government） has apparently 
followed the claims over the South China Sea actively made by the Taiwanese 
government ever since the Republic of China fled to Taiwan in response to 
a revolution12 which in turn has resulted in a situation in which the Beijing 
government appears to be aligned with Taiwan with respect to the South China 
Sea issues13. The historical and political factors deeply rooted in the ‘One-
Country, Two-Systems’ scenario described above, though not negligible at all, 
are beyond the scope of this study. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that the 
perspectives and arguments of both governments contain subtle nuances and 
differences. 
 Many writers in China categorise the grounds and legal interpretations 
of the dashed line that Chinese （and Taiwanese） commentators14 rely on 
into the following four viewpoints. （1） the idea that the line serves as the 
‘line of attribution of the islands therein’ or the line drawn on the map in 
order to display the will or intention regarding the occupation of the islands 
within the dashed line; （2） the line delineates the ‘scope of the historical 
rights’, indicating the realm in which the rights to conduct fishery and develop 
resources have historically been exercised; （3） the interpretation of the line as 
the ‘limits of the historic waters’ that indicate the bounds to which China’s 
sovereignty historically and traditionally reaches; （4） the concept of the line 
as the ‘traditional border line’, according to which the traditional sphere of 
Chinese influence is delineated15. The present author briefly summarises and 
analyses these four interpretations or doctrines below.
 The first interpretation, that is, the ‘line of attribution of the islands 
therein’, may be the most meaningful explanation under international law, 
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irrespective of its acceptance by the international community. The first reason 
for this seems to be that, in light of the usually accepted years of its origin 
（ca. 1946－1947）, the dashed line was initially drawn on the maritime part 
of the map in relation to, or as a representation for, the display of China’s 
intention to possess as its own territory the islands and other geographical 
features circumscribed by the line, although it is not clear at this point whether 
it intended to assert possession over the entire maritime area surrounding the 
islands and other geographical features within the dashed line. The second 
reason is that it appears from the drawing of the dashed line on the map and 
the surrounding conditions16 that the line used to designate the land border 
with its neighbouring states was also used in drawing the nine-dash line on the 
map. Accepting this first interpretation, however, does not necessarily mean 
that China’s claims of possession are admitted under international law; rather 
its attribution is considered separately under international law.
 According to the second interpretation, under which the line means the 
‘scope of China’s historical rights’, China’s possession of historical rights 
within the dashed line vests itself sovereignty over the islands, reefs, atolls, etc., 
within the dashed line and sovereign rights over all the natural resources in 
the maritime area thereof, admitting other countries’ freedom of navigation, 
overflight, laying of submarine pipelines, and so on. This interpretation can be 
assumed to hold that the integration of ‘historic’ factors into its own claims 
enables China to exercise its rights under international law especially effectively. 
As is shown below17, however, the concrete contents of the interpretation may 
readily raise various doubts under international law, since China, which refers to 
the ‘historical rights’ in its domestic law, has not clarified its intent.
 The third interpretation, ‘historic waters’, which is mostly supported by 
certain scholars in Taiwan, positions the area within the dashed line as China’s 
historic waters, where historical rights can be possessed over the islands, reefs, 
and atolls, as well as their surrounding maritime area, within the dashed line. 
As is discussed below18, there has been no acceptance of this doctrine by the 
international community, including the states concerned. China has never 
advocated this kind of historic maritime area, and Taiwan recently ceased 
official use of the term ‘historic waters’. 
 The last interpretation, ‘traditional border line （territorial boundary）’, 
maintains that the dashed line is the national boundary line, with the interior 
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belonging to China and the area outside comprising foreign countries or 
the high seas, and that the dashed line makes clear the division between the 
islands of the South China Sea and the sphere outside of them19. This kind of 
traditional standpoint concerning China’s territory, peculiar to China, and its 
unique viewpoint on borders, do not necessarily have a basis in international 
law （which is based on Western-centric historical views）20, and, accordingly, 
lack any support from the states concerned. Moreover, this interpretation 
cannot fully explain the nature of the maritime areas within the dashed line in 
a manner consistent with international law; it is also incompatible with both 
state practice and the laws and regulations related to China’s own treatment 
of maritime areas, as is shown below. However, if China, with its own way of 
thinking distinct from current international law, intends to oppose international 
law, which has been developed principally by Western countries, the assumption 
underlying its arguments will be flawed. 
 Here arises the question of whether the arguments described above 
with respect to the classification of the dashed line interpretations or doctrines 
will be at all useful for the solution of the territorial dispute. Although these 
categorisations and summaries may be academically or dogmatically interesting, 
whether they are beneficial to diplomatic practice is another matter, for the 
following reasons. First, whether these categories fully comprehend the 
substance that China formerly intended or currently intends is not clear, since 
the Chinese government has never officially pronounced them. Second, an 
agitation of states resulting from these interpretations or doctrines that may 
be said to be predictable only in ‘hindsight’ and the possible misleading of 
public opinion in the international community may provide China with an 
opportunity to prepare legal arguments and historical meanings that might 
enable it to underhandedly develop a comprehensive tactic for diplomatic 
negotiation between the states concerned. 
 In sum, considering that China has not clarified its legal viewpoints 
concerning the dashed line, the substantive matters involved in the South 
China Sea dispute may become rather entangled as a result of the hindsight 
with which not the authorities, but the academic community and experts, who 
could be easily assumed to have certain communications with the Chinese 
government, try to give meaning to the dashed line. Another thing to keep in 
mind is that the interpretation and explanation of the dashed line may have 
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become incomprehensible under international law （or the law of the sea） that 
has developed over time, since the dashed line may have changed and ended up 
taking the form that had not been intended when the line was first drawn21. In 
the next chapter, therefore, this article will examine the dashed line in light of 
history and state practice, touching upon some features and meanings included 
in these doctrines. 
Ⅲ．The Recent Movements Concerning the Dashed Line
 The theoretical study of the doctrines mentioned above regarding 
the interpretation and meaning of the dashed line seems to have developed 
in China by the 1980s, when the question whether these doctrines were 
compatible with UNCLOS was also considered22. The actual worldwide debate 
over the dashed line23 derived from the dashed line drawn on the map attached 
to the documents officially submitted by China to an international organ, 
probably for the first time. 
１．China 
 In order to justify its own claims, the People’s Republic of China 
submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf （CLCS） 
a note verbalee dated 7 May 2009, whose attached map （see Map 1） shows 
a U-shaped line consisting of nine segments of a dashed line drawn in the 
South China Sea24. The map and the dashed line attracted considerable 
attention because this was a very rare opportunity for the Chinese government 
to introduce, by way of an official document in the United Nations （UN） 
（or its specialised agencies）, the map on which the U-shaped dashed line was 
drawn in the South China Sea. The notes verbales, which were submitted in 
opposition of the joint submission made by Malaysia and Vietnam on 6 May 
2009, and of the Vietnam’s single submission on 7 May 200925 on the grounds 
that ‘［The continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as contained in the Joint 
Submission by the two countries］ has seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, 
sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the South China Sea’, objected to the 
respective submissions26 as follows:
  ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
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【Map 1】 The Map attached to an English Translation of the Note verbale of the 
People’s Republic of China dated 7 May 2009 （CML/17/2009） 
　　　　（ Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/c lcs_new/submissions_files/
mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf （accessed 29 September 2013））
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Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof （see 
attached map）. The above position is consistently held by the Chinese 
Government, and is widely known by the international community’. 
 The first thing that should be borne in mind is that the note verbale 
clearly states that China enjoys sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and its sovereign rights and jurisdiction concerning the relevant waters 
as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof, but does not concretely identify the 
islands and their scope. The second is that the note verbale only states the 
unilateral judgment, without any grounds for its claim that its ‘consistently 
held’ position ‘is widely known by the international community’27. This is 
why China has been criticised for its failure to provide a concrete and detailed 
explanation of the dashed line.
 In a note verbale dated 5 April 201128, the Philippines29 objected 
on the basis of its own archipelagic baselines30, stating that China’s claims 
‘would have no basis under international law, specifically under UNCLOS’31. 
Objecting to this note verbale of the Philippines, China again protested in 
a note verbale, dated 14 April 2011, to the UN Secretary General32 on the 
following two grounds: first, the fact that China has ‘indisputable sovereignty 
over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters’ is ‘supported 
by abundant historical and legal evidence’; and second, that the Philippines did 
not start invading or occupying any of the islands and coral reefs of the Spratly 
Islands until the 1970s, before which it had never made a claim to them. 
Moreover, China stressed the clarity of its sovereignty over, and the scope of, 
the Nansha （or Spratly） Islands, as well as UNCLOS and its domestic laws as 
legal grounds for the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zones （EEZs）, and 
the continental shelf of the Islands, stating as follows:
  ‘Since［the］ 1930s, the Chinese Government has given publicity several 
times［to］the geographical scope of China’s Nansha Islands and the 
names of［their］components. China’s Nansha Islands［are］therefore 
clearly defined. In addition, under the relevant provisions of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
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（1992） and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf of the People’s Republic of China （1998）, China’s Nansha Islands 
is［sic］fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone （EEZ） 
and Continental Shelf ’. （Stress in original）
 Furthermore, one should note that this passage （and the one immediately 
after it）33 apparently refers to the grounds for the territorial claims over the 
Islands, their geographical scope, the definition of the objects, and, as it were, 
the origin of the dashed line on the grounds that, ‘since［the］ 1930s’, China 
‘has given publicity several times［to］the geographical scope of China’s Nansha 
Islands and the names of ［their］ components’. Strictly speaking, the questions 
of whether the Nansha Islands can be really regarded as the ones defined under 
Article 121, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS34 and what legal status is given to the 
other islands in the South China Sea have not yet been answered conclusively, 
although China might have wanted to claim that the Nansha Islands have the 
status of the islands in the sense that they are surrounded by the territorial sea, 
the EEZs, and the continental shelf 35. 
 Against the above mentioned notes verbales submitted respectively by the 
Philippines and by China, Vietnam also made a protest in its note verbale dated 
3 May 201136, stating that China’s claims based on the dashed line are without 
legal, historical, or factual grounds, that ‘Hoang Sa （Paracel） and Truong Sa 
（Spratly） Archipelagos are integral parts of Vietnamese territory’, and that 
Vietnam has ‘sufficient historical evidences and legal foundation’ to assert her 
sovereignty over these two archipelagos.
 Behind the confrontations among China, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
at the CLCS of the UN concerning the debate over the islands in the South 
China Sea and its adjacent waters, lies a certain long period of history regarding 
the above mentioned U-shaped dashed line, before the paper war of diplomatic 
protest by way of notes verbales described above emerged. Accordingly, in the 
next part of this article, the meaning of the dashed line is investigated through 
its historical background. 
 Some writers have reported37 that the first appearance of the dashed line 
with respect to the South China Sea can be found in the personal views of a 
Chinese cartographer, expressed in December 1914, although the dashed line 
was first officially published by the Republic of China38 in December 1946 on 
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the ‘Map of the Location of the Islands in the South China Sea’ （“南海諸島
位置圖”） （see Map 2）39. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China also started 
publishing official maps that showed the dashed line, but it appears that no 
explanation of its legal meaning has ever been found, aside from explanations of 
its historical origin40.
 It seems that the dashed line was originally drawn as a dashed line 
consisting of eleven segments, but that it was modified to a dashed line 
consisting of nine segments, lacking, in the maps published in China after 
1953, the two segments drawn in the Bay of Tonkin41. Though the reason 
for this modification is not necessarily clear, some writers point out that then 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai （Chou En-lei） approved the deletion of the two 
segments from the dashed line42, and others suggest that the two segments were 
deleted in connection with the transfer of the territorial sovereignty over the 
Island of Bach Long Vi （Bai Long Wei） in the Bay of Tonkin43 from China to 
Vietnam44.
 In fact, it can be construed that the ‘Declaration on China’s Territorial 
Sea’ dated 4 September 1958, in which China declared the twelve-mile territorial 
sea （around the mainland and the islands） on the basis of straight baselines45, 
may have given China momentum to start claiming its territorial sovereignty 
over the Dongsha, Shisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha Islands, as follows:
 １） The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China 
shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories 
of the People’s Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland 
and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, 
the Penghu Islands and all other islands belonging to China which 
are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high 
seas.
 Here again, however, there is no evidence that the nine-dash line was 
used, and there is no indication of these four islands in the South China 
Sea. The sentence ‘all other islands belonging to China which are separated 
from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas’ may permit some 
nuance in interpretation, since no identification of these islands has been so far 
publicised. It can also be construed that China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction 
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【Map 2】 “Map of the Location of the Islands in the South China Sea” （「南海諸島位置
圖」） of December 1946 made by the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China
　　　　（ Source: http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/img/%E5%8D%97%E6% 
B5%B71.jpg （accessed 29 September 2013））
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over that part of the high seas are assumed to be under control in light of the 
law of the sea valid in 1958 on the ground that it is expressly prescribed that 
the high seas may exist46. If China, at that moment, had borne in mind that the 
high seas might exist around the islands in the South China Sea, it would not 
be possible to say that China had the intent to claim （or extend its sovereignty 
to）, in the name of ‘historic waters’, the entire South China Sea47.
 In addition, all of the four groups of islands except for the Zhongsha are 
clearly prescribed in China’s ‘Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of 25 February 1992’48, as follows:
 Article 2, paragraph 2
  The PRC’s territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, 
Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu 
Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha （Spratly） Islands, and 
other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of China. 
 Before its ratification of UNCLOS on 7 June 199649, China publicised 
in its ‘Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, 15 May 1996’50 the 
establishment of baselines only with respect to the mainland and the Xisha 
Islands on the basis of the straight baselines, but has not yet announced the 
baselines of the other islands. Furthermore, in its ‘Exclusive Economic Zone 
and Continental Shelf Act of 26 June 1998’51 （hereinafter cited as the EEZ 
& Continental Shelf Act）, China explicitly refers to its ‘historical rights’52, as 
follows:
 Article 14
  The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the 
People’s Republic of China.
Since China has not yet explained the meaning of the ‘historical rights’ 
referred to here or answered the question whether these rights are fishery rights 
or the rights to other natural resources, China, as a state party to UNCLOS, 
is certainly still required to explain this in accordance with international law, 
presenting the historical facts. China also passed a legislative measure after 
establishing the EEZ and its continental shelf to prescribe the scope of the 
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‘Protection of the Marine Environmental Protection Law of 1982’, amended 
on 25 December 1999, as follows:
 Article 2
  This law shall apply to the internal waters, territorial seas and the 
contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves 
of the People’s Republic of China and all other sea areas under the 
jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. ...
The wording of this provision reveals the existence ‘all other sea areas under 
the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China’ as the maritime area not 
categorised into the internal water, territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf, 
and, at the same time, suggests that, accordingly, this law is applicable even to 
the wide maritime areas whose legal natures or concrete geographical locations 
are vague. It is not easy to say that a State party to UNCLOS is entitled to 
such a vast and comprehensively wide maritime area through this type of 
phraseology under its domestic legislation. Moreover, there remain some 
questions as to the legal relationship of ‘all other sea areas under the jurisdiction 
of the People’s Republic of China’ with the waters where ‘historical rights’ are 
claimed and with ‘historic waters’. These points are also considered below.
２．Taiwan
 As is briefly discussed above53, the Republic of China first introduced the 
idea of the dashed line, while the Beijing government of the People’s Republic 
of China established after the 1949 revolution has almost completely followed 
the claims of the Taipei government in spite of certain departures. Though 
it may be often understood that the claims of the Taiwanese government 
concerning the South China Sea are almost the same as those of the Chinese 
government, a number of writers point out that the dashed line used by each 
government represents subtly different meanings54. It is therefore not easy for a 
third party to make a clear-cut distinction between the two standpoints. 
 In the ‘Maritime Policy Guidelines Concerning the South China Sea’ 
adopted on 13 April 199355, the Taiwanese government, using the term 
‘historic waters’, claimed sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea56, 
stating as follows:
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  ‘In light of history, geography, international law, and facts, the islands in 
the South China Sea are part of the inherent territory of the Republic of 
China, to which sovereignty over the islands belongs. The maritime area 
of the South China Sea within the limits of the historic water is the one 
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China, where the Republic of 
China possesses all the rights and interests.’ （Stress added by the author）
Though the concrete meaning is unclear, it has been suggested that the 
ground for the claim of ‘historic water’ lies in the line on the map published 
in 194857. However, the ‘Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of the Republic of China’ of 21 January 1998 does not include the term 
‘historic water’ any longer. It has also been suggested that, after the policy 
change adopted by the Chen Shui-bian administration in December 2005, the 
reconciliation between the Beijing and Taipei governments has been sought 
through the ‘Three Noes Policy’58 that was undertaken by the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration （which was born on 20 May 2008）. 
 Regarding the joint submission of 6 May 2009 made to the CLCS by 
Malaysia and Vietnam and the Vietnamese submission of 7 May 2009, the 
Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China claimed sovereignty over the islands 
of the South China Sea, as follows59:
  ‘From the viewpoints of history, geography and international law, the 
Nansha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Tongsha Islands and their adjacent waters 
and their subsoil thereof belong to the existent territory. Since it is an 
undeniable fact that sovereignty of these archipelagos belongs to our 
government, Taiwan enjoys, and is entitled to enjoy, all the rights.’
  ‘Diaoyudao, Nansha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Tongsha, and their adjacent 
waters, are inherent territory and waters of the Republic of China based 
on the title of indisputable sovereignty justified on the grounds of history, 
geography and international law....’ 
 Thus, the standpoint of ‘historic waters’ seems generally unsupportable 
partly because Taiwan has recently ceased using the term ‘historic waters’ 
which it had used in the past60, and partly because there has been no official 
document in which the Beijing government actually used the term of ‘historic 
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waters’, even though very little evidence shows that the Beijing government 
and Taipei government share the same position61.
Ⅳ．Some Considerations
１．The origin and the significance of the dashed line
 The question is often asked whether China （or Taiwan） has ever 
officially explained the meaning of the dashed line. Though the question 
arises in connection with the vagueness and arbitrariness of the line drawn on 
the map, China does not necessarily have a general obligation to answer the 
question62. China may, or may purport to, feel no need to explain the meaning 
of the dashed line, if the line still means the same thing, irrespective of whether 
it was drawn before or soon after the Second World War. This point can be 
presumed from the phrase in China’s note verbale that ‘［Its position］ is widely 
known by the international community’.
 In addition, it is often asked why the dashed line is not a single line 
but a dashed line consisting of nine segments63. The dashed line on the often 
cited ‘Map of the Location of the Islands in the South China Sea’ of 1946 
（see Map 2） has eleven segments in the maritime area in the form of a 
broken line （which is made of dots and lines, in particular） construed as the 
border between the （then） Republic of China and Vietnam. The length of 
each segment of this broken line is not necessarily same: some of the gaps 
between the broken lines are comparatively wide （e.g. the gap west of the 
Philippines）; some are relatively narrow （e.g. the gap west-southwest of the 
most southern tip of the Taiwan Island）; and there is a part where a ‘Y’-shaped 
line is diagonally drawn （e.g. between the Island of Borneo and the Islands of 
Parawan）. The comparison between this map of 1946 and the one attached 
to the 2009 note verbale （see Map 1） shows us some similarities, such as the 
rough shape of the dashed line （i.e. the U-shape） and the use of the broken 
line construed as the boundary between China and Vietnam, on one hand, and 
some differences, on the other. The nine segments of broken line forming the 
dashed line on the 2009 map64 are rather shorter than those on the 1946 map; 
each segment of the broken line on the 2009 map has three dots and lines 
respectively, with the gaps between the segments evenly spaced in relation to 
each other. The two maps’ dashed lines seem to have large overlaps, but their 
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respective location on each map does not seem to be the same. Moreover, the 
aforementioned ‘Y-shaped’ broken line cannot be identified on the 2009 map.
 The dashed lines drawn on the two maps have no clear indication of 
their precise geographical position in terms of latitudes and longitudes, and 
they do not overlap identically. Therefore, one cannot easily conclude that the 
dashed line was precisely drawn with a view to clearly indicating the correct 
location of anything65. The fact that there is no published information on the 
meaning or the concrete and precise location of the dashed line may critically 
reduce the general value of a map with the dashed line. 
 Taking an honest look at the original map, it may well be said that the 
original intention was only to indicate that the islands within the dashed line 
that had been initially used to indicate the boundary line, that is, the islands in 
the South China Sea, including the Nansha, Zhongsha, Xisha, and Dongsha 
Islands, were China’s territory66. It may be assumed that there was probably no 
precedent for drawing on the maritime area a dashed line using a continuous 
line （or curve） in order to indicate a border line, without indicating the 
starting point or the ending point, clarifying the correct position, or having any 
probable intention to possess even the waters within the line as the drawer’s 
own territory67. The present writer’s presumption is that these ideas may lie 
behind the background of the 1946 map （see Map 2）. 
 The point is that the shape and the apparent scope of intention to possess 
was so extraordinary and incomparable that the concerned neighbouring states 
have made increasingly more objections, and that at the same time, intellectual 
games, as it were, have been played in China in order to enable the dashed line 
to signify anything, or to indicate possession of the islands within its limits, and 
to imply any of various meanings regarding the waters within the dashed line.
 Although China has been strongly expected to explain the presumptive 
meaning of the line, it has adopted a firm and consistent stance declining to do 
so. Dr Zhang Haiwen, Vice-Director of the China Institute of Marine Affairs 
（CIMA） in the China’s State Oceanic Administration （SOA）, is of the 
opinion that China has no obligation or need to explain to foreign countries 
the legal nature or meaning of this maritime area68. It is true that no state is 
under a general obligation to explain to the international community as a whole 
the existence and the legitimacy of sovereignty over its own territory. In relation 
to the procedures of dispute settlement, including international litigation, no 
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country is obliged to refer, outside the procedure, to anything that may work 
against itself. It may also be natural that a country would normally try to 
avoid any explanation to that effect. Her opinion may be construed to indicate 
that China deliberately refrains from offering an explanation. In an interview 
of Chinanews dated 6 January 2012, Mr Yi Xianliang, a Chinese official in 
the Department of Border and Ocean Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, made a comment on the dashed line, merely saying that since 
UNCLOS is not applicable to matters occurring before it became valid, the 
dashed line ‘defines China’s territorial sovereignty and its related maritime 
interests’69. 
 One may, therefore, assume that China definitely pronounces the 
geographic scope of, and its own will to possess, the islands （including coral 
reefs and shoals） in the South China Sea, and that the reason why a dashed 
line （or a broken line） but not a single continuous line was used is that the 
dashed line is not a boundary line of the maritime area. It may be said that the 
dashed line, which is from time to time referred to as the ‘traditional maritime 
boundary’ of China, does not correspond to a strict maritime boundary, but 
only represents, for the sake of convenience, the scope of territory （including 
islands and similar geographical features） on a map. If the appearance of the 
dashed line on a map raises the question of the attribution of the islands, 
the real core issue is the legal status and the scope of ‘adjacent waters’ of the 
‘islands’ （including coral reefs and shoals） within the dashed line70. 
 Thus, the ascertainment of the international legal status of the ‘islands’ 
（including coral reefs and shoals） in the South China Sea under Article 121, 
paragraph 1 of UNCLOS also results in the determination of the legal nature 
and the scope of the adjacent waters of the islands in question71. Needless to 
say, however, the practical task of determining the legal status of the islands 
includes considerably difficult problems72.
２．Questions Concerning the Historic Waters and the Historic Rights73 
 It is normally said that China has not officially claimed that the South 
China Sea constitutes the ‘historic waters’. Is it valid under international law for 
China to claim that the waters inside the dashed line are the historic waters? In 
this case, what is the nature of the historic waters? Historic rights are usually 
considered to have not the scope, but a wider scope, than the concept of historic 
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waters74.
 Some writers presume that since the wording of Article 14 of the 
EEZ & Continental Shelf Act refers to the ‘historical rights’, China will not 
maintain the claim of historic waters going forward. However, China does not 
seem to have determined that it would be better to claim an area on the basis 
of historic rights than to claim within the regime of the 200-nautical-mile 
EEZ prescribed in UNCLOS to which it is a state party and its own EEZ & 
Continental Shelf Act. This is because China has clarified that the provision of 
Article 14 mentioned above expresses the position of principle concerning the 
question of the historic rights, interpreting the relevant provisions75 that refer to 
the ‘historic bay’ and ‘historic title’ in UNCLOS as embodying the ‘recognition 
and respect’ of the ‘historical rights’, and that this provision functions to express 
that, even after the establishment of the regime of EEZ and the continental 
shelf, China will not renounce the ‘historical rights’ that it has enjoyed in the 
adjacent waters76.
 Certainly, it may be possible for China to seek to maximise, in the name 
of historic waters, its maritime interest in all of the islands and their adjacent 
waters in the South China Sea within the dashed line. On the other hand, a 
question also arises as to whether relying upon the concept of historic rights 
that may not be bound by the regime of the 200-nautical-mile EEZ under 
UNCLOS is intended to assert historic rights to natural resources other than 
fishery. If the answer is affirmative, a question arises with respect to whether the 
claim for the historic rights will be accepted in the international community 
including the states concerned77.
 In fact, the claim to the historic waters incurs a great risk in international 
relations, since there has long been huge debate over the concept itself. 
Normally, the following three requirements must be met for historic waters to 
be recognised: first, the coastal states’ exercise of title in the region in question; 
second, continuity of the period of exercising this competence; and third, 
the attitude of other foreign countries towards the claim of historic waters78. 
However, what lies at the bottom of the concept of historic waters is the idea 
that an origin based on what is initially ‘an illegal situation’ subsequently 
becomes valid or complete not only by the lapse of time but also through 
acquiescence by the legitimate possessor or toleration by other countries. The 
concept of historic waters is, therefore, not considered as an established legal 
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principle under international law, because one cannot easily ascertain who the 
original legitimate possessor is or how to evaluate the existence and form of any 
acquiescence. 
 UNCLOS contains some provisions referring to ‘historic bays’ and 
‘historic rights’79. It is certainly difficult to claim that the South China 
Sea is a normal bay, and whether South China Sea is a historic bay is also a 
controversial issue. Judging from the wording of the Preface of UNCLOS80, 
these concepts will certainly be governed by general international law, that is, 
customary international law. However, the rules of customary international law 
concerning these concepts are unclear and not necessarily defined.
 Some judicial precedent is noteworthy. The International Court of Justice 
（ICJ） found, in its judgment of 1951 in the Fisheries case, that a Norwegian 
fishery held historic title mainly on the ground that consistent practice over a 
long period had not been objected to by foreign countries81, and pronounced, in 
the judgment of 1992 in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier （El Salvador/
Honduras; Nicaragua intervening） case, that the Bay of Fonseca as an object of 
the dispute was a historic bay under ‘joint sovereignty’ and that the waters of 
it were qualified as historic waters82. These legal regimes that govern historic 
meanings presuppose that each individual case is recognised as unique, as was 
found in the 1982 judgment in the Continental Shelf （Tunisia/Libya） case83. 
This judgment has been followed in the ICJ cases since then84. 
 With respect to China’s state practice in the South China Sea, it is 
important to examine questions such as to what extent China has exercised its 
jurisdiction within this dashed line and whether, in the course of these actions, 
there has been any protest from other countries. One may also include in these 
important questions how far state practice has gone in comparison with that of 
other countries85. 
 What are, then, the ‘historical rights’ that China can claim under its 
EEZ & Continental Shelf Act, provided that, as mentioned above, China has 
never claimed the maritime area within the dashed line as historic waters?86 
According to a doctrine, suggested by one writer, that among the historic 
rights is a right to fishery that has been conducted for a long time by Chinese 
fishermen, for example, the maritime area that does not fall into the category 
of the EEZ or the continental shelf may also become entitled to the same 
legal status as the area of the EEZ and the continental shelf and their subsoil, 
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whereas the maritime area where the ‘historical rights’ are claimed will 
exceed 200 nautical miles and will be, even within 200 nautical miles, subject 
to domestic laws and regulations different from those of the EEZ regime87. 
Another writer states that the claim of the dashed line has been clarified 
because China used a combination of the concept of sovereign rights in the 
EEZ and the continental shelf under UNCLOS with the concept of the 
‘historical rights’ to claim all the living and non-living resources within the 
dashed line88. 
 In 2011, in fact, a Chinese foreign minister and a spokesperson of 
the Foreign Ministry, respectively, made official statements to the effect that 
the dashed line was what China’s sovereignty rights over the South China 
Sea have established and developed ‘in the long process of history’. China’s 
contention that there had been no criticism or protest from foreign countries 
even after the publication of the map in which the dashed line was drawn89, if 
true, may to a certain degree account for the view that there had been tolerance 
or acquiescence by the international community including the states concerned 
about China’s unilateral actions such as the publication of the map containing 
the dashed line90.
 In light of China’s state practice, therefore, it is difficult to think that 
China intends to claim the concept of historic waters that may be treated as 
internal waters or the territorial sea, as far as the provisions of China’s EEZ & 
Continental Shelf Act indicate91. In the discussion of the International Law 
Commission （ILC）, the historic bay was widely pointed out as a concept that 
was disadvantageous to the countries with shorter histories but advantageous to 
the countries with longer histories92. As it is not easy, at any rate, to find a rule 
of international law that governs the ‘historical rights’ of China, it seems that 
one can neither definitively rule out the idea that the claim of China is contrary 
to international law, nor definitely identify a basis in international law.
V．Conclusions
 Noteworthy developments have also recently occurred with respect to the 
conflict among states concerned about the meaning of the dashed line claimed 
by China, in relation to the dispute over the South China Sea. For instance, 
China and the ASEAN states parties have, through diplomatic negotiations, 
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continued their effort to upgrade the 2002 ‘Declaration of the Conduct of the 
States concerned in the South China Sea’ （DOC）93 as a political document to 
a ‘Code of Conduct’ （COC） as a legally binding normative instrument. The 
‘initiative of Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation’ （ZoPFF/
C）94 proposed by the Philippines in 2011 withered all too soon without 
considerable support from other ASEAN states95. Probably due to the lack 
of strong initiative from the chairing country and of concerted action by the 
ASEAN states, the negotiation process has not necessarily been very fruitful. 
Behind this lies the tug of war between China, who, on the basis of the dashed 
line, maintains an assertive position in the South China Sea, and opposing 
states that deny the dashed line and claim their own maritime interests96.
 It has been reported that the Chinese government unofficially told 
a high-ranking American official97 that the South China Sea is its own 
‘core interest’98. Some writers regard China’s assertive attitude as the 
most remarkable recent development99. While the unilateral submission by 
the Philippines of the dispute with China over the South China Sea may 
somehow enable the clarification of the meaning of the dashed line in the 
litigation process, the prospects for negotiation on a COC between China 
and the ASEAN states parties have become bleaker. Even though the arbitral 
procedure instituted by the Philippines may, to a certain degree, lead to the 
disentanglement of the issue of the dashed line without a result in favour of 
China, it is not certain that a judgment or award made by a third party under 
the procedure that is not in accordance with the will of a party to the dispute 
will guarantee favourable consequences100. One should not always look at the 
South China Sea dispute through the lens of Eurocentric international law101. 
 In my view, the solution to the dispute over the South China Sea is 
not confined to the arguments regarding a judgment on the legal meaning 
of the dashed line that is issued within the framework of international law, 
but also entails a plan for maintaining peace and stability in the maritime 
area by eradicating the fundamental confrontational factors including the 
territorial dispute through peaceful means and cooperation among all the states 
concerned102. In this sense, therefore, one cannot be too optimistic about the 
prospects of this arbitral procedure. 
 It is at the same time necessary for the states concerned to make every 
effort to change or even soften the attitude of China, which is supposed to have 
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maintained, ever since, the idea of joint development of the resources therein 
with the idea of shelving the territorial problem in the South China Sea103. The 
problem of the dashed line, which is deeply rooted in the long history of this 
region, is too difficult to solve solely under international law and requires more 
practical, comprehensive and multifaceted approaches. 
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